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Abstract
Perspective taking – the ability to see things from someone else’s point of view – can boost
success in communication. A signaler might take perspective when designing an utterance
that is informative from the receiver’s point of view, or the receiver might take perspective
when inferring the signaler’s communicative intentions. Perspective taking is supposed to
play a particularly vital role when people try to communicate in the absence of a
conventional signaling system. However, the task demands in such cases are extremely
different from those in typical experimental approaches to perspective taking. Thus,
current evidence for perspective taking does not establish whether humans can take
perspective in those cases where perspective taking is arguably most helpful. We describe
experimental tests of perspective taking that are suitable for settling the matter. Our task
focuses on the use of shared world knowledge rather than shared visual scenes, and it is
suitable for both open-ended and contextually constrained responses. We show that people
generally fail at perspective taking in a novel signaling task, but that perspective taking
can be boosted by contextual constraint. In that case, however, it is context, rather than
perspective taking or shared world knowledge, that explains communicative success.
Keywords: perspective taking, novel signaling task, knowledge, context, coordination
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Perspective taking in a novel signaling task: effects of world knowledge and contextual
constraint
Introduction1
When we speak, we mostly communicate using conventional signals such as words.2
But we can also communicate using non-conventional signals. We are able to produce and3
understand novel gestures (Fay, Arbib, & Garrod, 2013; Schouwstra & de Swart, 2014),4
pictures (Garrod, Fay, Lee, Oberlander, & MacLeod, 2007), vocal sounds (Perlman & Cain,5
2014), or deictics (Misyak, Noguchi, & Chater, 2016). This includes games involving6
spontaneous gesture (e.g., charades) or graphical signals (e.g., Pictionary), or gesturing7
with people who do not share our language. Call these all novel signaling tasks.8
How do humans succeed at communicating in such tasks? A plausible answer is9
shared world knowledge (Clark, 1996; Levinson, 2006; Lewis, 1969; Schelling, 1960).10
Suppose a signaler intends to communicate the idea of a snake to a recipient. If they both11
know what snakes look like and how they behave, the signaler might use this shared world12
knowledge to produce a vocalization or gesture that resembles or imitates the snake in13
some way. However, signalers typically have several options (Mangold & Pobel, 1988).14
They could vocally imitate a snake’s hiss, or gesturally imitate its fangs, its biting strike,15
winding movement, or swaying head movement. These various pieces of knowledge are16
unlikely to be equally successful in getting the recipient to guess that the intended message17
was ‘snake’. For example, a gestural representation of a snake’s winding motion might well18
make the recipient think of a fish.19
How does a signaler choose the most effective cue? A common answer is that the20
speaker takes the perspective of the person receiving the signal, evaluating — from the21
receiver’s point of view (POV) — which cue is likely to lead to the correct inference (e.g.,22
Clark & Murphy, 1982; Levinson, 2006; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Our main aims are to23
test whether (and if so, when) people can take the perspective of others in a novel signaling24
task and whether (and if so, when) shared knowledge leads to communicative success. We25
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show that neither shared world knowledge nor perspective taking are general solutions to26
the question of how we communicate in the absence of convention. In particular, we show27
that (1) in the general case, people do not succeed well at perspective taking; (2) shared28
world knowledge can sometimes hinder communicative success; (3) but contextual29
constraints can promote perspective taking, thereby boosting communicative success.30
Background31
Coordination, world knowledge and salience32
Lewis (1969) offers a game-theoretic account of how people coordinate in the absence33
of convention. If we can expect people to behave a certain way, we can coordinate with34
them without explicit agreement. For example, if one did not know which side of the road35
locals drive on in a foreign country, one could simply observe their behavior and drive on36
the same side as they do, based on the expectation that they will continue to drive on that37
side. One could thus behave conventionally without explicit agreement.38
But although one can directly observe what side of the road someone drives on, one39
cannot directly observe the communicative intentions underlying a previously unseen40
signal. We will refer to tasks like deciding which side of the road to drive on ‘cognitively41
transparent’ and those like deciding what a new signal means ‘cognitively opaque’ (Gergely42
& Csibra, 2003). Cognitively opaque tasks need something more than observing others’43
behavior. To enable coordination in such tasks, Lewis appeals to shared world knowledge,44
and in particular, patterns of salience in that knowledge. Levinson makes a similar point in45
setting out preconditions for human interaction (including communication): ‘[Coordination]46
presupposes the notion of mutual knowledge (or common ground) . . . But it also involves a47
notion of mutual salience — what leaps out of the common ground as a solution likely to48
independently catch our joint attention’ (2006, p. 49, emphasis Levinson’s).49
Such accounts rely on focal or ‘Schelling’ points. Schelling (1960) describes a50
coordination task in which people are asked where and when they would meet someone in51
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New York City if they had not previously made any arrangements. There are many52
possibilities for places and times to meet, but some will be more salient than others: they53
stand out in some way, or are more likely to occur to people than the other possibilities.54
Most of Schelling’s respondents said they would choose to meet at Grand Central Station.55
Schelling’s interpretation is that this is a salient choice. Lewis extends this claim into a56
larger argument that patterns of salience in shared world knowledge allow people to57
coordinate in the absence of convention, and Scott-Phillips, Kirby, and Ritchie (2009)58
highlight the role of Schelling points in novel signaling tasks.59
However, even though people can use salient aspects of world knowledge to60
coordinate, it is not clear how general this finding is. One reason for caution is that61
Schelling’s participants shared a significant amount of context: they were all students at62
Yale in New Haven, Connecticut in the 1950s, so Grand Central Station would have been63
where most of them arrived in New York City (Verbeek, 2008). Perhaps this shared64
context (the participants all being from New Haven, rather than a random sample of65
Americans in general) is as much a driver of success as salience. We thus aim to study the66
effect of context by comparing open-ended tasks (where the target could be any English67
word) and contextually constrained tasks (where participants know the target must be one68
of a small set of words).69
A second reason for caution is that, although studies such as Mehta, Starmer, and70
Sugden (1994) confirm the role of Schelling points in achieving coordination, their tasks do71
not involve communication, so it is unclear whether their results extend to novel signaling72
tasks. We thus aim to compare behavior in communicative and non-communicative tasks.73
In sum, a proposed explanation for human performance in novel signaling tasks is74
that we share patterns of salience in world knowledge (Levinson, 2006; Lewis, 1969;75
Scott-Phillips et al., 2009). However, the evidence for this cited above typically reflect76
constrained contexts, or non-communicative tasks (or both). One aim of the present work77
is thus to compare communicative and non-communicative versions of a coordination task,78
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and to manipulate the level of contextual constraint, in order to see how these factors79
affect people’s responses. It remains possible that having shared knowledge would not help80
people coordinate communicatively in the absence of a tightly constrained shared context.81
Why communication presents a particular challenge82
Even if salience predicted participants’ responses (i.e., signals or guesses) in83
communicative as well as non-communicative tasks, it might nonetheless not contribute84
equally to success across task type. The same salience-driven response may be a good85
coordination strategy in one type of task but not in another. One reason for this worry is86
that communication introduces two asymmetries that may hinder success.87
The first source of asymmetry is differing patterns of salience in world knowledge.88
For example, money is a salient feature of banks. When people think of banks, they are89
likely to think of money. However, it does not follow that banks are a salient feature of90
money. When people think of money, they are vastly less likely to think of banks1. These91
claims are empirically supported by word association studies (e.g., Nelson, McEvoy, &92
Schreiber, 2004). In such studies, participants respond with the first word they think of93
when given a cue. Nelson et al. found that, of over 100 participants asked to think of a94
word given the cue ‘bank’, 80% responded with ‘money’. However, given cue ‘money’, fewer95
than 2% responded ‘bank’. Associative norms derived from such studies thus potentially96
serve as an empirical yardstick for salience (and Study 1 below demonstrates that they do).97
In a non-communicative task, such salience asymmetries do not necessarily pose a98
problem. If two participants are given cue ‘bank’ and asked to try coordinate by generating99
the same one-word response, they would probably both respond with ‘money’ and thus100
succeed. However, the people in this example had the same starting point, whereas101
1 While there is a salience asymmetry between banks and money, other aspects of world knowledge are
more symmetric: when people think about brides, many of them are likely to also think of grooms, and
when they think of grooms, they are likely to also think of brides.
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participants in a novel signaling task often work in opposite directions: the signaler has a102
target meaning they want to convey, and must generate a signal based on that meaning.103
The receiver, on the other hand, must infer the target meaning from the signal (Sperber &104
Wilson, 1995). Thus, communication introduces a second source of asymmetry. It is the105
combination of salience asymmetry and communicative asymmetry that may be a potential106
block to successful coordination, since this means that what is salient to the signaler is not107
necessarily salient to the receiver, and vice versa, despite sharing world knowledge.108
Thus, even if there is a strong relationship between salience and success in a109
non-communicative coordination task, there might be a disjunction in a communicative110
task. Another aim of the present work is to see whether salience guides behavior and111
contributes to coordination success equally across different tasks.112
Perspective taking113
The above asymmetries imply a difference in perspective: what is salient from the114
signaler’s point of may not be salient from the receiver’s point of view. If asymmetry115
hinders communicative success, then the ability to take an interlocutor’s perspective could116
be a potential counterbalance, a way to boost success (Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell,117
2003; Surtees, Apperly, & Samson, 2013; Todd, Forstmann, Burgmer, Brooks, & Galinsky,118
2015). This raises the question whether people are able to take perspective in a novel119
signaling task by working out what is allocentrically salient (salient from their120
interlocutor’s point of view) or whether they are typically egocentric (responding based on121
what is salient from their own point of view).122
According to the theory of pragmatics put forward by Sperber and Wilson (1995),123
people should be able to take perspective in such a task. For them, a key factor is what124
they term ‘accessibility’. Something is accessible insofar as one is likely to think of it. For125
example, in thinking about snakes, perhaps their fangs are more accessible than their126
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cold-bloodedness2. In this account, receivers generate hypotheses about meaning in order127
of accessibility and signalers should thus (to the best of their abilities) select or structure128
the information they share so that their target meaning is maximally accessible to the129
receiver. This is called audience or recipient design (Clark & Murphy, 1982) and it130
presumes perspective taking since signalers must have at least a rough idea what is131
accessible to the recipient.132
Do people actually take perspective in communicative tasks? Experimental data on133
the subject is mixed (Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011). There is evidence supporting the134
use of perspective taking or audience design (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Brown-Schmidt,135
Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus, 2008; Clark & Murphy, 1982; Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983;136
Hanna et al., 2003; Hilliard & Cook, 2016; Metzing & Brennan, 2003; Rubio-Fernández,137
2008), as well as evidence highlighting its lack, both for speakers (Epley, Keysar,138
Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner,139
2000; Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998) and listeners (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Paek, 1998).140
Various models attempt to account for these seemingly inconsistent patterns of141
behavior. (1) A constraint-based model (Hanna et al., 2003) argues that allocentric142
information is available early on in processing, but that it is just one source of information143
that probabilistically drives behavior, and that it can sometimes be overridden by144
egocentric information. (2) According to perspective-adjustment models (Epley, Keysar, et145
al., 2004; Keysar et al., 2000; Wu, Barr, Gann, & Keysar, 2013), early processing is purely146
egocentric, and that this perspective can be adjusted to include allocentric information,147
but that this adjustment occurs relatively late and only if it is necessary. (3) An148
2 Lewis (1969) and Levinson (2006) use the term ‘salience’, while Sperber and Wilson use ‘accessibility’.
However, the meaning of these terms is strikingly similar: if something is salient, it stands out from the
other alternatives and should be more likely to occur to people, i.e., it should be more accessible. Mehta et
al. (1994) call this ‘primary salience’. We show that accessibility is a good predictor of behavior in a
Schelling-like task (Study 1), and thus use ‘salience’ to mean ‘salience or accessibility’. However, Study 4
and the general discussion offer a more nuanced position and discuss other kinds of salience.
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anticipation-integration model (Barr, 2008) argues that listeners can anticipate allocentric149
information prior to hearing an utterance, but when interpreting a heard utterance, they150
fail to integrate that allocentric information.151
Other factors affecting perspective taking include salience (Wardlow Lane & Ferreira,152
2008), time pressure (Horton & Keysar, 1996), motivation (Epley, Keysar, et al., 2004),153
cognitive load (Cane, Ferguson, & Apperly, 2017), mood (Converse, Lin, Keysar, & Epley,154
2008; Todd et al., 2015), anomalies in input (Bögels, Barr, Garrod, & Kessler, 2015),155
executive control (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Nilsen & Graham, 2009), working memory (Cane156
et al., 2017; Wardlow, 2013), novelty and expertise (Gann & Barr, 2014), speaker identity157
(Metzing & Brennan, 2003), age (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010; Epley,158
Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004), or cultural differences (Wu & Keysar, 2007).159
In these studies, differences in perspective are typically operationalized in terms of160
what participants can see: a common manipulation is to occlude one side of a cubbyhole,161
such that its contents are only visible to one participant3. But even if participants can162
sometimes take perspective on the basis of seeing what the other sees (a cognitively163
transparent task), this does not imply they can do so on the basis of knowing what the164
other knows (a cognitively opaque task), in the absence of visual common ground. Since165
shared knowledge is a proposed driver of behavior in a novel signaling task, another aim of166
the present work is to focus on the effect of shared world knowledge, as opposed to a167
shared visual scene.168
This focus on shared world knowledge is a methodological departure from previous169
research in perspective taking. Thus, we do not explicitly evaluate the particular170
predictions of the models outlined above, but simply test whether people spontaneously171
3 Though this is a common task design in perspective taking research, other methodologies have been used.
For instance, Epley, Keysar, et al. (2004) explore perspective taking in cases of sarcasm or irony, and
Langdon, Davies, Coltheart, et al. (2002) used cartoon stories, though, neither case involves a novel
signaling task.
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take perspective in a novel signaling task.172
There is evidence showing that people are generally egocentric in their use of173
knowledge. Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber (1989) show that people do not discount174
their own privileged information when dealing with naive others in a decision-making task.175
This effect – ‘the curse of knowledge’ – has been shown to impact perspective taking (Birch,176
2005; Birch & Bloom, 2007). However, these tasks are not communicative and thus do not177
speak directly to whether such knowledge plays a role in novel signaling tasks. Galantucci178
(2009) finds evidence for egocentric behavior in a novel signaling task. However, this does179
not speak directly to the question of shared world knowledge because egocentricity in this180
case seems to be principally a matter of whether people know that others are attending to181
them, or of not realizing that the signal’s visual appearance is ambiguous.182
The present experimental task183
The above discussion has implications for our experiment design. First, we need a184
task that, with minor alterations, can be used for communicative or non-communicative185
coordination between people. Second, the task must be amenable to both contextually186
constrained responses and open-ended ones. Third, we need a task that offers few187
opportunities for coordination except those based on shared world knowledge. Finally,188
since we aim to test for a possible dissociation between response behavior and189
communicative success, we need an empirical measure of salience that is task-independent.190
Mehta et al. (1994) assume that salience guides coordinative behavior and conclude that191
whatever people respond with during a coordination task is thus salient. This introduces a192
degree of circularity that, while not fatal to their project, would be problematic here.193
Our experimental task is illustrated in Fig. 1. In the non-communicative version194
(Fig. 1a, Study 1 below), both participants are given a one-word cue (in this example,195
‘bank’) and they try coordinate by independently generating the same one-word response.196
For instance, if both participants generated the response ‘money’, they would succeed.197
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This is similar to the task used by Mehta et al. (1994), except for being more open-ended4.198
In the communicative version (Fig. 1b, c), the signaler is given the cue, and must generate a199
one-word signal to help their partner guess the cue. In a contextually unconstrained200
version (Study 2), both signaler and receiver can generate any English word. In other201
versions of the task, we constrain the context (Studies 3 and 4) by forcing the signaler or202
receiver to pick their response from a list of options, and we manipulate whether they are203
both given that list, or just one of them is.204
There are several reasons for limiting cues and responses to single words. First, it205
affords an empirical, task-independent measure of salience. Associative strength (AS)206
values taken from published norms (e.g. Nelson et al., 2004) reflect the likelihood that207
someone given a particular cue will produce a particular response, all else being equal. If208
80% of participants in such a study responded ‘money’ when given cue ‘bank’, then209
AS(money|bank) = .8 (for which read, the associative strength of response ‘money’ given210
‘bank’). On the common assumption that salience is a driver of coordination behavior211
(Clark et al., 1983; Levinson, 2006; Lewis, 1969; Mehta et al., 1994; Schelling, 1960), if AS212
predicts responses in our task, then AS is demonstrably a guide to salience. In that case,213
the fact that the vast majority of people responded with ‘money’ given ‘bank’ in Nelson et214
al. (2004) is evidence that money is a salient feature of banks. This provides a measure of215
salience that is independent of coordination success, so if participants produce ‘money’ as a216
response in both the communicative and non-communicative versions of the task, then we217
have evidence that salience drives their behavior, even if this response leads to success in218
Fig. 1a and failure in Fig. 1b.219
Second, it affords a way to distinguish egocentric and allocentric salience, since AS is220
directional. In Nelson et al. (2004), some people were given ‘bank’ as a cue (and most221
responded ‘money’). Others were given ‘money’ as a cue (and almost none responded222
4 In that task, participants coordinated by naming colors, makes of car, or types of flower, whereas here
participants are not constrained by a particular semantic category.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 1 . (a) Non-communicative task. Both participants are given cue ‘bank’ and told to coordinate by
generating the same word, i.e. respond with the same word that they think the other participant will. Here
they both respond ‘money’ and are thus successful. (b) Communicative task where the signaler is given cue
‘bank’ and told to produce a one-word signal to help the receiver guess this target. Here, the signaler
happens to signal ‘money’. Given this signal, the receiver guesses ‘cash’. Thus they are unsuccessful. (c)
The same communicative task. The signaler is given cue ‘bank’ but this time happens to produce signal
‘teller’. Given this signal, the receiver guesses ‘bank’ and they are thus successful. Associative Strength
(AS) values (Nelson et al., 2004), represent how likely it is that the participants in their study produce a
particular response when given a particular cue. AS(y|x) represents the proportion of people in Nelson et
al. who responded with y when given x.
‘bank’). Thus, from the point of view of someone given ‘bank’, money is highly salient, but223
from the point of view of someone given ‘money’, banks are not salient. From the signaler’s224
point of view in Fig. 1b, then, money is egocentrically salient, but not allocentrically225
informative. On the other hand, from the signaler’s point of view in Fig. 1c, a teller is not226
egocentrically salient, but is allocentrically informative. AS values can thus be used to test227
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whether people are taking perspective (i.e., are more likely to generate a signal such as228
‘teller’ than one like ‘money’).229
Third, a focus on single words allows us to isolate (as much as possible) effects of230
world knowledge. The one-word signal is the only information passing between signaler and231
receiver. Thus, the participants cannot rely on shared visual information (as in most232
perspective taking tasks), or on a shared history of interaction, which strongly affects233
signaling behavior (Brennan & Clark, 1996). Rather, they must rely on what they know234
about the referents of the various cues or signals.235
Finally, it ensures a relatively clean measure of salience. In a game such as236
Pictionary, the graphical signal has several sub-parts. To signal ‘Harrison Ford’, for237
instance, someone might draw a man with a fedora, a whip and a gun. These may well be238
salient features of Harrison Ford construed as Indiana Jones, but it is difficult to isolate the239
contribution of each of these individual elements to guessing success, given the whole240
picture, and the same holds for spontaneous gesture. This issue is a potential confound241
when measuring communicative success (Sulik, 2018). Similarly, if the signal were an entire242
sentence (such as ‘the place where money is deposited’ for ‘bank’), it would be243
prohibitively difficult to isolate the contribution of ‘money’, ‘deposit’, or even ‘place’ to the244
likelihood that someone would guess ‘bank’.245
Overall, this design allows us to test whether shared knowledge and perspective246
taking can explain responses or success in a novel signaling task. Signaler and receiver247
share a lot of world knowledge, so money is a salient feature of banks for both of them.248
However, only the signaler knows that banks are relevant to their current interaction and249
thus has ‘bank’ as a starting point. If the signaler acts egocentrically, they would probably250
produce ‘money’ as a signal (Fig. 1b). But ‘money’ does not make ‘bank’ salient to the251
receiver, in which case they would probably fail to guess ‘bank’. In that case, they might252
fail to communicate despite shared world knowledge. Alternatively, the signaler might be253
able to take perspective, which involves suppressing the egocentric salience of ‘money’ and254
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finding an allocentrically informative signal, such as ‘teller’ (Fig. 1c).255
This task is similar to the television gameshow Password (examples can be found256
online at www.youtube.com with the search term ‘password gameshow’), so it is certainly257
something humans are capable of. A similar task was used by Ryskin, Benjamin, Tullis,258
and Brown-Schmidt (2015) as a test of prospective perspective taking (perspective taking259
from the point of view of one’s future self, with participants generating a cue such that260
would help them recall the target when given the cue a few days later). They found that261
AS predicted successful recall. We go further by exploiting the directional nature of AS to262
contrast egocentric and allocentric behavior, and by evaluating how likely people are to263
generate particular cues. Further, since the literature on novel signaling tasks shows that264
there is a difference in informativeness between generating a signal for one’s self and doing265
so for another person (e.g., Garrod et al., 2007; Little, Eryılmaz, & de Boer, 2017), we test266
the effect of AS on response behavior when coordinating with another person.267
It may be objected that the use of one-word cues and signals involves conventional268
language and is thus not a novel signaling task comparable with spontaneous gesture or269
graphical signaling. However, while ‘money’ is a conventional way to refer to money and270
‘teller’ is a conventional way to refer to a teller, the key point is that they are not271
conventional ways to refer to banks, so the game, though using conventional stimuli, does272
not rely on conventional signaling. Since the task affords a neat, objective measure of273
salience, we consider this advantage to outweigh any potential negatives.274
Summary and predictions275
Two main factors are commonly argued to explain human success in novel signaling276
tasks: shared world knowledge (especially patterns of salience in that knowledge) and277
perspective taking. We have argued that, while salience has been shown to drive response278
behavior in a non-communicative task, it does not follow that it does so in a279
communicative task. Even if it does, it need not predict success. Similarly, while people are280
PERSPECTIVE TAKING IN A NOVEL SIGNALING TASK 16
sometimes capable of perspective taking with shared visual scenes, it does not follow that281
they can do so in a novel signaling task that relies on shared world knowledge. We thus282
seek to explore the contributions of salience, perspective taking and context to success in a283
novel signaling task.284
Study 1 explores coordination behavior based on world knowledge in a285
non-communicative task (Fig. 1a). We test whether associative strength predicts responses286
and success. If so, this measure serves as an empirical yard stick for salience in this287
Schelling-like task. Study 2 explores an otherwise-similar communicative task (Fig. 1b, c).288
Again, we test whether associative strength predicts responses and success. We also exploit289
the directionality of associative strength measures to test whether people are able to take290
perspective in a novel signaling task. We predict that salience will drive participant291
responses in both the communicative and non-communicative tasks, but that participants292
will behave egocentrically, and that success will be significantly lower in the communicative293
task.294
Finally, in Studies 3 and 4 we explore contextual effects. Study 3 constrains the295
signal space by forcing the signaler to choose from a list of potential signals, while Study 4296
constrains the meaning space by situating the target in a list of distractors. Additionally, it297
explores the role of common ground by manipulating whether the receiver shares this list.298
We predict that context will be a major driver of success. In that case, the explanatory299
burden must shift away from mutual salience and perspective taking and onto contextual300
factors. Finally, in study 5, we replicate the main results from studies 1-4 with a larger301
sample size.302
Study 1: Coordination without communication303
Overview304
Participants took part in a non-communicative coordination task in which they were305
given a list of items. For each item, they were asked to coordinate by responding with the306
PERSPECTIVE TAKING IN A NOVEL SIGNALING TASK 17
same word that other people would respond with. The main aims were (1) to provide a307
benchmark for coordination success. By drawing a comparison with the next study, this308
will allow us to assess whether communicative coordination is more of a challenge than309
non-communicative coordination. (2) To show that associative strength (AS) — a measure310
of accessibility derived from databases of word association norms (Fig. 1) — predicts311
coordination behavior. If it does, then associative strength can be used as a measure of312
salience, allowing us to test in the following study whether signalers are able to take313
perspective, seeing what is salient from the receivers’ point of view.314
Participants315
We recruited 20 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. They received316
$1 in payment. Participation was limited to those registered as being in the USA, who had317
an approval rate of over 95%, and who had previously completed >1000 tasks. We ensured318
that no participant took part in more an one study, managing participation with Turkgate319
(Goldin & Darlow, 2013) and Turkprime (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017). The320
study was approved by the University of Wisconsin-Madison Education and321
Social/Behavioral Science IRB.322
Materials323
We compiled a list of 20 one-word items to act as cues (see supplementary materials),324
based on word-association norms from Nelson et al. (2004). Our cue items were evenly325
divided into symmetric and asymmetric words, defined as follows. If the top associate of326
word X is word Y and the top associate of word Y is word X, then item X is symmetric.327
For instance, the top associate of ‘day’ is ‘night’ (AS = .819) and the top associate of328
‘night’ is ‘day’ (AS = .686). On the other hand, an item is asymmetric if word X strongly329
cues Y but Y does not strongly cue X. For example, ‘bank’ strongly cues ‘money’330
(AS = .799) but ‘money’ does not strongly cue ‘bank’ (AS = .019). This ensures that some331
items would provide a difference in perspective (cf. the discussion of asymmetry above, and332
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Fig. 1). Additionally, we filtered the shortlist of asymmetric items so that for each item,333
there exists a word Z such that Z is weakly associated with X, but X is strongly associated334
with Z. For instance, ‘bank’ weakly cues ‘teller’ (AS = .028) while ‘teller’ strongly cues335
‘bank’ (AS = .814). This ensures that there exists a signal for the following study that336
would be informative for the receiver (cf. Fig. 1c). To allow participants some337
morphological and typographical leeway, ‘goodbye’, ‘good-bye’, ‘good bye’ and ‘goodbyes’338
all counted as the same response. We collapsed the AS norm data across these distinctions.339
Procedure340
The participants were told they would play a word-guessing game in which they341
would be given a cue, such as ‘puppy’, and would have to think of one word in response to342
this cue, such as ‘dog’. They were told that the aim of the game was to answer with the343
same word as another participant that they would be randomly paired with. This is similar344
to the verbal coordination task in Mehta et al. (1994), but more open-ended. Participants345
were then given the 20 cue items in a randomized order and were reminded each time to346
think of a response that would match someone else’s. They were able to produce any347
English word as a response. There was no time limit on providing a response.348
Analysis349
There are two measures of interest. The first (coordination index) is a measure of350
how successful people were in coordinating over a given item. Mehta et al. (1994) define351
the coordination index as the probability that, over all possible pairings within the set of352
participants, the pairs responded with the same word. Let N be the number of353
participants, k the number of distinct responses to a given item and m1, ...,mk the number354
of participants that gave each response. Thus, the coordination index is calculated as in355
formula 1.356




(mi/N)[(mi − 1)/(N − 1)] (1)
This index serves as a baseline for comparison with the communicative task in the357
next study. The second measure (response count) is the number of participants producing358
each response (m1, ...,mk above), indicating how likely it is that participants generate a359
particular response.360
Our main predictor is AS. Since responses to such a task are assumed to be based on361
salience (cf. Lewis, 1969; Mehta et al., 1994), we will test whether AS significantly predicts362
response counts. If so, AS is a measure of salience. Additionally, we test whether the363
maximum AS of an item predicts the coordination index. Consider, for example, the top 5364
associates of items ‘cut’ and ‘bulb’ (Fig. 2a). The top-ranking associate of ‘bulb’ has an AS365
of .788, and the next highest is just .027. In that case, ‘light’ should be strongly salient366
given ‘bulb’. On the other hand, the top-ranking associate of ‘cut’ has an AS of just .168,367
so although ‘blood’ is relatively salient given ‘cut’, there is no word that is as salient for368
‘cut’ as ‘light’ is for ‘bulb’. It would therefore not be surprising if more people are able to369
coordinate for ‘bulb’ than for ‘cut’, and we therefore predicted that the coordination index370
for an item will be predicted by its maximum AS.371
For this and all subsequent studies, reported AS values come from the University of372
South Florida (USF) Free Association Norms (Nelson et al., 2004). In addition, to ensure373
that these results reflect intersubjective rather than subjective salience, we checked for374
agreement with associative strengths drawn from other databases. Data collection for the375
Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus (EAT, Kiss, Armstrong, Milroy, & Piper, 1973) was376
similar to the USF norms, except that the participants spoke British rather than American377
English. The Small World of Words database (SWOW, De Deyne, Navarro, & Storms,378
2012) differs from the USF and EAT norms in allowing multiple responses rather than just379
one, and in being a voluntary, mass online study rather than a supervised in-person study.380
We assessed the robustness of our results by examining whether they hold for all these381
PERSPECTIVE TAKING IN A NOVEL SIGNALING TASK 20
measures of AS.382
Results383
Coordination success. Fig. 2b shows the coordination index for each item384
(M = .46, SD = .24). This is similar to the mean value for the verbal-coordination tasks in385
Mehta et al. (i.e., their questions 1 to 10; M = .44, SD = .21). In line with the386
‘light’|‘bulb’ and ‘blood’|‘cut’ example in Fig. 2a, the variation in coordination indexes is387
significantly predicted by maximum AS of each item (linear regression388
β = 1.08, SE = 0.18, t(18) = 5.86, p < .001; Fig. 2c). The more salient the top-ranking389
associate, the easier it was for people to coordinate. The model accounts for much of the390
variance in the coordination index (adjusted R2 = .64).391
Response behavior. To model how likely it was that participants would generate392
each response, we used a binomial mixed-effects regression with the proportion of393
participants generating each response as the dependent variable, and AS as the predictor394
(for random effects structure, see supplementary material). The response proportions were395
positively predicted by AS (β = 5.24, SE = 0.24, z = 21.83, p < .001; Fig. 2d). For396
instance, in response to item ‘bank’, 15 of 20 participants responded ‘money’ (AS = .799)397
and just two of 20 responded ‘account’ (AS = .035). These conclusions held across398
word-association databases (see supplementary material).399
Since ‘money’ is a more common word than ‘account’, it is possible that the effect of400
AS might reduce to an effect of word frequency. To rule this out, we model the effect of401
word frequency on coordination behavior using frequency data from SUBTLEXUS402
(Brysbaert & New, 2009), though the frequency data is log-transformed into a Likert-like403
scale as recommended by Van Heuven, Mandera, Keuleers, and Brysbaert (2014). When it404
is the only explanatory variable in the model, word frequency predicts coordination405
behavior (β = 0.36, SE = 0.08, z = 4.47, p < .001): the more common a word, the more406
participants generated it. However, when both word frequency and AS are included in the407

























































































































Figure 2 . (a) An example of the associative strength values of the top-5 ranking associates of two cue
items, ‘bulb’ and ‘cut’, from Nelson et al. (2004). (b) The coordination index by item. (c) Linear regression
fit of maximum associative strength per item as a predictor of coordination index. Maximum associative
strength represents the top-ranked associate of each item (e.g., ‘light’ for ‘bulb’ and ‘blood’ for ‘cut’). (d)
The number of people producing each response (dots) and binomial model fit (curve).
model, the effect of word frequency is no longer significant (β = −0.1, SE = 0.08,408
z = −1.32, p = .188), while AS remains a significant predictor (β = 5.27, SE = 0.25,409
z = 21.37, p < .001). The effect of AS is thus not a proxy for word frequency.410
Discussion411
The principal aims of Study 1 were (1) to quantify the level of coordination success to412
serve as a baseline for comparison with a communicative task in Study 2; and (2) to test413
whether associative strength (AS) between the cue and target words predicts response414
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behavior. We found (1) that participants were able to coordinate 46% of the time, a result415
similar to verbal coordination tasks in Mehta et al. (1994); and (2) that AS strongly and416
significantly predicted coordination behavior. When there was a strong associate of an417
item, participants were likely to produce that as their response, and the likelihood of their418
doing so varied along with the strength of the association. This is not explicable as an419
effect of word frequency. Further, the more salient an item’s top associate, the more likely420
people were to coordinate successfully.421
Since various accounts (e.g., Lewis, 1969) argue that salience guides coordination422
behavior, a reasonable interpretation of result (2) is that AS is a guide to salience: the423
more salient Y is given X, the more likely it is that the word for Y occurs to people given424
the word for X in an association study, so the higher its AS. This makes AS a good425
empirical measure of salience (in as far as it predicts behavior here). Since the AS values426
were derived from large-scale studies that had nothing to do with coordination, using these427
as our predictor variables in what follows avoids the circularity of arguing that people428
coordinate by picking a salient response, and then claiming that their response is salient429
because they produced it when coordinating. Sperber and Wilson (1995) frame their430
account in terms of accessibility rather than in terms of salience, but accessibility is even431
more transparently related to AS than salience is: the more accessible a word Y is given432
word X, the sooner Y would occur to someone when given X.433
To be clear, our finding that salience plays a role in non-communicative coordination434
does not mean that participants must represent whatever is salient to them as also being435
salient to others. The most parsimonious explanation is that participants simply respond436
with whatever is most salient from their own point of view, since that is what AS437
measures. Coordination is thus achievable without taking into account what others may be438
thinking. The main goal of Study 2 was to examine whether people would still take such439
an egocentric approach, even when taking the perspective of the receiver would improve440
the chance of success.441
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Study 2: Coordination for communication442
Overview443
Participants took part in a novel signaling task where signalers were given a list of444
target items, and had to come up with a one-word signal to help the receiver guess the445
target. Receivers were given these signals and had to make a guess what the target was.446
The main aims here are to test (1) whether coordination in an open-ended communicative447
context is significantly harder than in a similar non-communicative task and (2) to test448
whether people’s responses are better predicted by egocentric (own-POV) or allocentric449
(other-POV) salience.450
Participants451
We recruited 10 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service to serve as452
signalers. These signalers produced a total of 128 unique signals. To determine the453
communicative effectiveness of the signals, 80 receivers were each given a random sample of454
16 signals (16 is a factor of 128), resulting in 10 guesses for every signal. Participants were455
paid $1.456
The number of unique signals increases rapidly with the number of signalers. Thus, a457
small increase in the number of signalers means a large increase in the number of guessers.458
For practical reasons, we have thus kept N low in this study. An alternative strategy would459
be to collect guesses for a subset of signals (e.g., using all signals produced by more than460
one signaler, and then additionally sampling from the signals produced by just one461
signaler). We pursue this alternative with a larger N in the replication in Study 5.462
Materials463
This study used the same list of cue items from Study 1.464
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Procedure465
The signalers were told that they would be playing a word-guessing game in which466
they would have to think of one-word signals that would help someone guess their items.467
They were talked through an example: if the item was ‘dog’, then a good signal would be468
‘puppy’ since most people given ‘puppy’ would probably guess ‘dog’. They were given the469
20 items in a randomized order. Under each item was a text entry box to input their470
signal. After all signal words were collected, a similar survey was presented to the471
receivers. They were told they would be playing a word-guessing game, and that someone472
else had chosen a one-word signal to help them guess the item. The instructions walked473
them through the ‘puppy’ example from the receiver’s point of view. In neither case was474
there a time limit on responding.475
Analysis476
In addition to allowing leeway in spelling and morphology as mentioned previously,477
we counted a guess as correct if it was a compound containing the item, but only when the478
item was the head of the compound (e.g., ‘lightbulb’ is a correct guess for ‘bulb’ since a479
lightbulb is a kind of bulb, whereas ‘doghouse’ is not a correct guess for ‘dog’ since it is a480
kind of house, not a kind of dog). This issue did not arise in Study 1.481
Let k be the number of distinct signals produced for an item across all signalers. Let482
s1, ..., sk be the number of signalers producing each of the signals 1, ..., k and let g1, ..., gk be483
the number of guessers correctly guessing the item, given each of the signals 1, ..., k. Thus,484





Despite differences in formulas (1) and (2), it will be worth testing whether the486
‘coordination index’ for the previous study and the ‘correctness score’ for the present one487
are related. They are similar in that they both represent the success criteria for each488
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response. For Study 1, success is calculated as the number of other participants providing489
the same word; in the present study, success is the number of receivers guessing the target.490
In both cases, success is calculated per response, and then success values are aggregated491
per item.492
One conceptual difference is that the interactions in the present study are determined493
by assigned communicative role, whereas the interactions in the previous study are494
calculated over all possible pairings. Despite this difference, since these tasks involve the495
same items, participants have access to the same world knowledge. Thus, by comparing496
success scores, we can investigate whether the same world knowledge can be leveraged to497
coordinate communicatively (where perspectives may differ) and non-communicatively498
(where perspectives align).499
Since AS is directional, to streamline the presentation of results, we will call the AS500
from whatever the participant is given to whatever they produce ‘forward’ and the reverse501
‘backward’. Thus, in Fig. 1c, the signaler is given item ‘bank’ and produces signal ‘teller’, so502
from their point of view, forward AS = .03 and backward AS = .8. The receiver, on the503
other hand, is given signal ‘teller’ and produces guess ‘bank’ so from their point of view,504
forward AS = .8 and backward AS = .03. Thus, regardless of communicative role (signaler505
vs. receiver), egocentric salience (salience from one’s own point of view) is represented by506
forward AS and allocentric salience (salience from the other’s point of view) is represented507
by backward AS.508
Results509
Success. Coordination success (M = .3, SD = .24) was worse than in the previous510
task (difference in means = .16, bootstrapped 95% CIs [.045, .275]). Coordination in this511
communicative task was thus significantly more difficult than coordination in an otherwise512
similar non-communicative task.513
In Study 1, the variation in coordination success across items was predicted by the514
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maximum AS from an item to its top-ranking associate (cf. the ‘light’|‘bulb’ vs.515
‘cut’|‘blood’ example above). In the present study, a linear regression finds no effect516
(β = −0.18, SE = 0.13, t = −1.38, p = .186), though success was higher for symmetric517
than for asymmetric items (β = 0.13, SE = 0.06, t = 2.14, p = .047). By item, there was518
no correlation between success at the previous task and success at the present one519
(r = −.013, p = .96, Fig. 3a).520
Shifting focus from by-item success to by-signal success, the AS from signal to item521
was a significant positive predictor of how many receivers guessed each signal correctly522
(β = 0.94, SE = 0.07, t = 12.85, p < .001, Fig. 3b), whereas the AS from item to signal is523
now significant, but negative (β = −0.16, SE = 0.08, t = −2.1, p = .039). As illustrated by524
Fig. 1, the positive effect of signal-to-item AS means that success here is driven by525
receiver-POV rather than by signaler-POV salience. In fact, the negative effect of the526
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Figure 3 . (a) Each point represents an item. Coordination success for an item in Study 1 is uncorrelated
with coordination success in Study 2. (b) Each point represents a signal, while the line represents a linear
regression fit of the relationship between signal-to-item associative strength and coordination success.
Signaler behavior. As previously, we analyzed the relationship between AS and528
the proportion of signalers producing each signal with a binomial mixed-effects regression529
(Fig. 4). Forward AS significantly predicted how many signalers generated each signal530
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(β = 1.5, SE = 0.48, z = 3.1, p = .002), but backward AS did not (β = −0.2, SE = 0.43,531
z = −0.47, p = .639). Thus, signalers behaved egocentrically: they were more likely to532
produce signals that were salient from their own point of view. See supplementary material533
for random effects structure, a demonstration that this conclusion holds across associative534
norms databases, and interaction terms.535
When it is the only predictor in the model, word frequency falls just short of536
significance (β = 0.13, SE = 0.08, z = 1.71, p = .088). When forward AS is included in the537
model, the effect of word frequency remains nonsignificant (β = 0.009, SE = 0.08, z = 0.1,538
p = .919) and forward AS remains significant (β = 1.6, SE = 0.3, z = 5.25, p < .001). The539
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Figure 4 . (a) Binomial mixed-effects regression coefficients for the effect of associative strength on the
proportion of signalers producing each response. (b) Model fit (curve) and data (points).
Receiver behavior. Like signalers, receivers behaved egocentrically since forward541
AS significantly predicted the proportion of receivers generating each guess (β = 3.42,542
SE = 0.21, z = 16.38, p < .001, Fig. 5) whereas the effect of backward AS was not543
significant (β = −0.31, SE = 0.2, z = −1.57, p = .116). See supplementary material for544
random effects structure, a demonstration that this conclusion holds across associative545
norms databases, and interaction terms.546
Word frequency is a significant predictor of responses when it is the only predictor in547
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the model (β = 0.21, SE = 0.03, z = 6.4, p < .001). When forward AS is included in the548
model, word frequency falls short of significance (β = 0.07, SE = 0.04, z = 1.69, p = .092),549
though forward AS remains significant (β = 3.26, SE = 0.19, z = 17.27, p < .001). As550
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Figure 5 . (a) Binomial mixed-effects regression coefficients for the effect of associative strength on the
proportion of receivers producing each response. (b) Model fit (curve) and data (points).
Comparing behavior across tasks. Potential differences in behavior across tasks552
include (a) the degree to which participants were egocentric, and (b) the degree to which553
salience predicted behavior.554
To explore (a), we merged all data sets discussed so far, after introducing a variable555
to represent task (with values ‘non-communicative’, ‘signaler’ and ‘receiver’). We analyzed556
the relationship between forward AS and responses with a binomial mixed-effects557
regression (Fig. 6a) that included an interaction between task and forward AS. Participants558
in the non-communicative task were significantly more egocentric than receivers, who were559
in turn more egocentric than signalers (Fig. 6b). However, in Study 5 we find that the560
difference between communicative and non-communicative behavior replicates, but the561
difference between signalers and receivers does not.562
To explore (b), we noted that the spread of data points about the regression curves in563
Fig. 4b and Fig. 5b was wider than in Fig. 2d. We calculated bootstrapped confidence564
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intervals for the pseudo-R2 for each of these models (R21, Kvålseth, 1985). Salience was a565
stronger predictor of behavior in the non-communicative task than it was in either of the566
communicative ones (Fig. 6c). Thus, there is a disjunction between participants’ degree of567
egocentricity (the β representing the effect of forward AS in Fig. 2d, 4b, 5b) and the extent568
to which participants rely on salience at all (the pseudo-R2 values of those models). While569
receivers and non-communicative participants were both more egocentric than signalers,570
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Figure 6 . (a) Binomial mixed-effect regression coefficients for the effect of forward associative strength on
the proportion of receivers producing each response, including an interaction with task. The base level
represents the receiver in the communicative task. (b) Model predictions for the effect of forward
associative strength. (c) Adjusted pseudo-R2 values, using R21 from Kvålseth (1985).
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Discussion573
Participants typically behaved egocentrically rather than allocentrically. Since success574
here was driven by receiver-POV salience, and since signalers typically failed to respond575
allocentrically, coordination success was significantly lower than in the non-communicative576
task. Performance was worse when items involved a difference in perspective (asymmetric577
items). Thus, although diverse approaches (e.g., Levinson, 2006; Lewis, 1969; Sperber &578
Wilson, 1995) argue that shared world knowledge and perspective taking allow people to579
communicate in the absence of a conventional signaling system, we have found that neither580
signalers nor receivers consistently take an allocentric perspective when they have to rely581
on shared world knowledge to coordinate, and that this can hinder communicative success.582
Mehta et al. (1994) show that Schelling-like focal points exist and that people are583
able to use them to coordinate in a non-communicative task. However, the results here584
show that such conclusions do not extend to coordination in open-ended communicative585
tasks, meaning that salience and shared world knowledge are thus not general solutions to586
the problem of coordination in the absence of convention, contrary to claims reviewed587
above. All the participants in both studies discussed so far presumably knew that money is588
a salient feature of banks. However, this only enabled them to coordinate when they have589
the same starting point (i.e., were both given cue ‘bank’, as in Study 1), but it was a590
hindrance to communication here (e.g., ‘money’ was the most popular signal for item591
‘bank’, though it was uninformative from the receiver’s POV).592
Previous work has shown that people sometimes fail to take perspective (e.g., work593
by Keysar and colleagues), but these have tended to focus on visual salience — seeing what594
others can and cannot see in one’s immediate environment. Our study focuses instead on595
salience in world knowledge. While AS was a strong predictor of behavior in the596
non-communicative task (meaning that it is a good empirical yardstick for salience in world597
knowledge), it was significantly less predictive in the communicative task. Thus, rather598
than claiming that world knowledge does or does not play an explanatory role in599
PERSPECTIVE TAKING IN A NOVEL SIGNALING TASK 31
coordination behavior, researchers should focus on how it contributes differently according600
to the nature of the task.601
A potential limitation of our results would be if signalers were egocentric because602
they simply did not have access to information that would allow for an allocentric603
response. For example, perhaps signalers simply did not know that ‘teller’ would work604
better than ‘money’ as a signal for ‘bank’. In Study 3 we therefore test whether605
participants know this and can use this information in a more constrained situation. If so,606
this would confirm that the failure to use it in Study 2 was not due to a lack of knowledge,607
but rather due to the inaccessibility of that knowledge and the difficulty inherent in taking608
someone else’s perspective.609
Study 3: A constrained signal space610
Overview611
The previous study explored perspective taking in an open-ended task: the only612
restrictions were the instruction to try coordinate, and the requirement that the response613
be an English word. The present study tests whether people can take perspective in a614
constrained context. For example, if the target is ‘bank’, instead of open-endedly615
generating any word they wish, now signalers must choose one signal from the list:616
‘money’, ‘teller’, ‘vault’, ‘loan’, ‘safe’. In particular, since the previous study found success617
to be driven by receiver-POV salience, we test whether signalers are able to select the most618
allocentrically informative signal given a constrained signal space.619
Participants620
We recruited 20 signalers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service, 10 to choose a621
signal that they thought would help someone else to guess the item, and 10 to choose a622
signal that they thought would help themselves guess the item (this instructional623
manipulation has no effect on any of the results below, for which see supplementary624
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material, so we do not discuss it here). Each participant received $1. From the receiver’s625
point of view, this task is precisely the same as in Study 2, so where available, we simply626
reused data from Study 2 to provide guesses used in calculating correctness scores (formula627
2). For signals not generated previously, we recruited further receivers (again, 10 per628
signal), but this meant that receivers saw a variable number of signals. They were paid an629
amount proportional to $1 for 20 signals.630
Materials631
For every item, we generated a list of five potential signals as follows. The list632
contained the top-ranking associate of the item in the USF database (e.g., for item ‘bank’,633
the list contained ‘money’). Where different, it also contained the word in the USF634
database for which the item was the top-ranking associate, since this was an informative635
signal (e.g., ‘bank’ was the top-ranking associate of ‘teller’). If the most popular signal in636
Study 2 was not one of these, we additionally included it. The rest of the list was sampled637
from signals generated in Study 2.638
Procedure639
The signaling task was explained to participants as previously. They were then given640
all 20 items in random order and along with each item, a list of five potential signals (also641
in random order). Participants were asked to choose from the five signals. Half the642
signalers were asked to pick which item they thought would help someone else to guess the643
item, and the other half were asked to pick which signal they thought would help644
themselves guess the item. There was no time limit on each response.645
Results646
Overall coordination success (M = .5, SD = .19) was similar to performance in Study647
1, but a significant improvement over Study 2 (difference in means= .20, bootstrapped 95%648
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CI [.118, .282]). Constraining the signaling space thus significantly boosts coordination649
success.650
We entered forward and backward AS as fixed effects into a binomial mixed-effects651
regression. The outcome variable was the proportion of signalers choosing each signal.652
While forward AS predicted signaling choices in both Study 1 and Study 2, it falls just653
short of significance here (β = 0.63, SE = 0.33, z = 1.9, p = .057, Fig. 7a, b), and backward654
AS is now a significant predictor (β = 2.27, SE = 0.42, z = 5.41, p < .001). Constraining655
the signaling space thus promotes perspective taking. The model pseudo-R2 = .32, so656
salience explained behavior less than in Study 1, and about the same as in Study 2. See657
supplementary materials for random effects structure, and a demonstration that this effect658
does not reduce to one of word frequency.659
Across word association norms databases, there is consistently a significant effect of660
backward AS, but for the other databases (EAT and SWOW), there is additionally a661
significant (though smaller) main effect of forward AS. The conclusion, then, is that when662
the signal space is constrained, participants are more allocentric than egocentric, though663
they are nonetheless somewhat egocentric.664
The inclusion of a two-way interaction between forward and backward AS665
significantly improves model fit (χ2(1) = 14.65, p < .001). In addition to the effect of666
backward AS (β = 3.29, SE = 0.475, z = 6.93, p < .001) there is a significant (though667
smaller) effect of forward AS (β = 1.0, SE = 0.46, z = 4.1, p < .001). The interaction term668
(β = −4.04, SE = 1.08, z = −3.75, p < .001) means that backward AS has less of an effect669
when forward AS is high (Fig. 7c, right panel), and participants still behave somewhat670
egocentrically at times, though only for low values of backward AS (Fig. 7c, left panel).671
Discussion672
A constrained signal space boosted coordinative success as high as it was in the673
non-communicative task (Study 1). Unlike in previous tasks, participants behaved674
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Figure 7 . (a) Binomial mixed-effects regression coefficients (without an interaction term) for the effects of
forward and backward associative strength on the proportion of signalers producing each response. (b)
Model predicted response counts (curve) and data (dots). (c) Model fit for the proportion of signalers
generating each response, including an interaction term between backward and forward associative
strength. For each panel, the darkest line represents the main effect of the variable on the x-axis (i.e., when
the value of the other variable, labelled on the legend, is 0). As the value of the other variable increases,
the color becomes lighter. Thus, a comparison of the left and right panels shows that the main effect of
backward associative strength is larger than that of forward associative strength. The right panel shows
that the effect of backward associative strength is positive for all but the highest values of forward
associative strength, while the left panel shows that forward associative strength only has a positive effect
for lower values of backward associative strength.
allocentrically. Salience was as poor a guide to behavior as it was in the open-ended675
communicative task (Study 1).676
There are two (potentially compatible) ways of framing this result. One is that677
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people are egocentric in the general, open-ended case but can behave allocentrically in678
constrained communicative contexts, such as when the signal space is limited in this way.679
The second is that people are egocentric when generating hypotheses about communicative680
choices (since in Study 2, they had to generate their own signals) but that they can be681
allocentric when evaluating hypotheses (since in Study 3, they just had to evaluate which is682
the best of the given signals). Untangling these two possibilities may have implications for683
how we should explain the evolution of language in our species, since the first focuses more684
on the communicative context (open vs. constrained signal space), and the second focuses685
more on cognitive abilities (hypothesis generation vs. evaluation).686
Either way, the present result is useful since it demonstrates that the signalers in the687
open-ended task possess the relevant information: it’s not that they simply didn’t know688
‘teller’ would make a better signal than ‘money’ for ‘bank’; it’s that ‘teller’ simply didn’t689
occur to them as a signal, given that their behavior was driven by egocentric salience, so690
they don’t even have the chance to evaluate the informativeness of ‘teller’. People do indeed691
share the relevant world knowledge, but the trick lies in bringing that world knowledge to692
bear on a particular problem. Signalers managed to do so here, but not in the previous693
study. Thus, it is overly simplistic to claim that salience drives coordination behavior. A694
more realistic claim is that salience, task (e.g., communicative vs. non-communicative) and695
context (e.g., constrained vs open-ended signal space) interact to do so.696
Study 4: A constrained meaning space and common ground697
Overview698
Here we test whether constraining the meaning space has an effect on communicative699
behavior, since constraining the signal space did so in study 3. There are doubtless several700
ways of doing this, but here we explore the effects of placing a target item in the context of701
distractor items which share patterns of salience. For example, the most salient signal702
given target ‘bank’ is ‘money’, so we place ‘bank’ in the context of four distractor items for703
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which ‘money’ is highly salient.704
Additionally, we manipulate whether or not the signaler knows that the receiver has705
access to the same constrained meaning space. This allows us to test the effect of common706
ground on perspective taking. In general, a signaler and receiver can assume that much of707
their world knowledge broadly overlaps. However, sharing world knowledge in this708
unconstrained sense did not help them take perspective in Study 2. Here we test whether709
people take perspective when attention is focused on a constrained meaning space, either710
for the signaler only (the ‘no-common ground task’), or for both the signaler and receiver711
(the ‘common ground task’).712
Participants713
Payment and requirements for participants are the same as described previously. As714
previously, 10 signalers saw each item, and 10 receivers saw each signal. Since the number715
of unique signals varied across items, the number of signals seen by each receiver varied.716
From the receiver’s point of view, the no-common-ground task is precisely the same717
as in Study 2 and 3, so where available, we simply reused data from those studies to718
provide correctness scores. For signals not generated in previous studies, we recruited719
further receivers as described for Study 3.720
Materials721
For each target item, we identified the egocentrically most salient associate, and then722
constructed a set of distractors by selecting four other words that strongly cue the same723
associate. For example, the associate with the highest forward AS from item ‘bank’ is724
‘money’, so the set of distractors was ‘cash’, ‘fund’, ‘wallet’ and ‘profit’. The target and the725
distractors together constituted the constrained or focal meaning space.726
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Procedure727
Participants were given similar instructions as previously, including the same ‘puppy’728
example from previous studies. Signalers were told they would be shown a list of five729
potential target items (e.g., ‘bank’, ‘cash’, ‘fund’, ‘wallet’, ‘profit’ in a randomized order)730
and told to read them over. After clicking a button to indicate they had read through the731
list, one of the five items was highlighted, and they were told that this was the item they732
should get someone to guess. Though it appeared to them that it was a random selection,733
each time the target item was simply the item that has been used in all the studies above734
(in this case, ‘bank’).735
Additionally, they were told during the initial instructions that the receiver either736
would or would not have the same list of 5 items in front of them while guessing. Thus, in737
the common-ground task, their goal was just to get the receiver to pick the target from the738
list. In either task, they were reminded about whether the guesser would have the list739
before every trial, and could generate any English word as in Study 2.740
Receivers in the common-ground task were given the same list of five potential items741
(in a randomized order) and told to guess which one the signaler intended to signal.742
Receivers in the no-common-ground task are not given a list to choose from, and could743
guess any English word, as in Study 2. In neither task was there a time limit.744
Results745
Accuracy. Coordination success for the common-ground task (M = .72, SD = .15)746
was higher than the no-common-ground task (M = .40, SD = .17, bootstrapped 95% CI747
for the difference in means [.227, .424]). Constraining the meaning space for the receiver748
thus improved performance. Fig. 8 illustrates that this was the best performance across all749
studies: making the receiver pick from a list of items (4b) improved accuracy even more750
than making the signaler pick from a list of signals in Study 3 (bootstrapped 95% CI for751
the difference in means [.138, .31]).752
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In the no-common ground task (4a), performance was better than the open-ended753
task 2 (bootstrapped 95% CI for the difference in means [.003, .191]) and poorer than task754
3 (bootstrapped 95% CI for the difference in means [-.197, -.003]). Thus, constraining the755
meaning space for the signaler improved performance relative to the open-ended task, but756




























Figure 8 . Mean values for coordination success (formula 1 for Study 1, formula 2 for others) across studies.
4a represents the no-common-ground task; 4b the common-ground task.
Signaler behavior. For both the common-ground and no-common-ground tasks,758
we modeled the effect of AS on the proportion of signalers generating each signal with a759
binomial mixed-effects regression. See the supplementary material for random effects760
structures and a demonstration that the effects below do not reduce to an effect of word761
frequency.762
For the common-ground task, signalers’ behavior was predicted by backward AS763
(β = 0.56, SE = 0.39, z = 2.69, p = .007, Fig. 9a, b) but not by forward AS (β = 0.73,764
SE = 0.4, z = 1.4, p = .162, model pseudo-R2 = .3). There was some inconsistency across765
association norms databases (see supplementary material), though the Akaike Information766
Criterion for the USF database reported here was the lowest. Thus, instead of concluding767
that signalers were straightforwardly allocentric in this task, we draw the weaker conclusion768
that they were at least somewhat allocentric. There was no significant interaction.769
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For the no-common-ground task, both forward and backward AS were significant770
predictors, though the former has a larger effect (forward AS β = 1.52, SE = 0.5, z = 3.06,771
p = .002; backward AS β = 0.85, SE = 0.38, z = 2.24, p = .025; model pseudo-R2 = .25,772
Fig. 9c, d). Across AS norms databases, the effect of forward AS was consistently773
significant and consistently larger than that of backward AS.,The effect of backward AS774
was not significant for the EAT database. Thus, signalers were more egocentric than775
allocentric, though they were still allocentric relative to the open-ended task (Study 2).776
There was no significant interaction term.777
We combined data for the two versions of this task in order to explicitly model the778
effect of the instructional manipulation (telling signalers that the receiver had access to the779
same list of targets or not). We included a pair of two-way interactions: between task and780
forward AS, and between task and backward AS. There were significant main effects for781
both forward AS (β = 1.04, SE = 0.35, z = 2.99, p = .003) and backward AS (β = 0.82,782
SE = 0.34, z = 2.41, p = .016) but not for task (β = −0.28, SE = 0.17, z = −1.62,783
p = .105). There was no significant interaction between task and forward AS (β = −0.91,784
SE = 0.52, z = −1.74, p = .082) or backward AS (β = 0.21, SE = 0.50, z = 0.42, p = .67).785
On the whole, then, when the meaning space was constrained in this way, signalers786
exhibited both egocentric and allocentric behavior, though the former effect was larger.787
Receiver behavior. From the receiver’s point of view, the no-common-ground task788
is precisely the same as in Study 2. Thus we focus on the common-ground task here789
(though see supplementary material for the no-common-ground task, which replicates the790
results from Study 2). Again, we use a binomial mixed-effects regression to model the791
effect of forward and backward AS on the proportion of receivers that selected each guess.792
There is a significant positive effect of forward AS (β = 9.16, SE = 2.29, z = 4.0, p < .001)793
and a smaller, negative effect of backward AS (β = −0.97, SE = 0.39, z = −2.48, p = .013,794
model pseudo-R2 = .18, Fig. 10a, b). See supplementary material for random effects795
structure, word frequency and results across norms databases.796








−2 −1 0 1 2






























−2 −1 0 1 2
























Figure 9 . (a) Binomial mixed-effect regression coefficients for the effect of associative strength on the
proportion of signalers producing each signal in the common-ground task. (b) Model fitted response counts
(curve) and data (points). (c) The same model of behavior in the no-common-ground task. (d) Model
fitted response counts (curve) and data (points) in the no-common-ground task.
However, it is obvious from Fig. 10b and from the low pseudo-R2 values that797
something other than AS predicts almost all of the variation in guessing behavior. Like798
most other studies, the responses in Fig. 10b are spread widely, but unlike any other study799
so far, they cluster strongly at AS=0, do so across the full range of response counts, and do800
so for both forward and backward AS. Most of the variation in receiver behavior, then, is801
not meaningfully captured by salience as measured by AS. However, high response counts802
are spread across the range of values of forward AS, and low response counts across the803
range of values of backward AS, and this seems to be driving the model estimates.804
Nonetheless, something must be guiding receiver behavior, since receivers were more805
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likely to converge on correct guesses (Fig. 10c). However, it would be explanatorily vacuous806
to say that receivers are driven by correctness here since that raises the question of how the807
receiver knows what the correct guess is. The above model is thus misspecified in that it is808




















































Figure 10 . (a) Binomial mixed-effect regression coefficients for the main effects of associative strength on
the proportion of receivers selecting each guess in the common-ground task (bootstrapped 95% CIs). (b)
Model predictions (curve) and data (points). (c) Data colored by whether the guess was correct or not to
indicate that receivers were able to converge on correct guesses.
Discussion810
Constraining the meaning space promoted coordination success. Constraining it for811
the receiver yielded the highest success rate across all studies. Constraining it only for the812
signaler also promoted success, but did so to a smaller extent than constraining the813
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signaling space (cf. Study 3).814
Additionally, constraining the meaning space promoted a degree of perspective taking815
in the signaler. Across task versions, signalers exhibited a mixture of egocentric and816
allocentric behavior. If common ground drives coordination in the absence of convention, it817
does so in the sense that participants’ attention is drawn to a small subset of shared818
knowledge, rather than having to rely on the vast background body of shared world819
knowledge.820
Constraining the meaning space for the receiver caused AS to be a poor predictor of821
guessing behavior. To illustrate, consider a couple of signals unique to this task. To cue822
item ‘bank’, one participant signaled ‘pig’ and 9 of 10 receivers given this signal correctly823
guessed ‘bank’. Coordination success was thus high, though pigs are not ordinarily salient824
features of banks, thus having low AS. Another participant signaled ‘building’. Again, 9 of825
10 receivers guessed correctly. Although banks are buildings, this feature is not usually826
salient (likely because it is non-specific). One is a metaphor or metonym (‘pig’, though827
possibly the signaler intended ‘piggy’ as a collocation) and the other is a semantic828
relationship not captured by AS (‘building’). It is the prominence of such signals that829
distinguishes this task from all others, in terms of the cluster of responses at AS = 0830
(Fig. 10b).831
Perhaps there are several kinds of salience, then: one that is measured by AS and (at832
least) one other that is not. While being a building is not ordinarily a salient feature of833
banks, it may be salient in this context since none of the other items are buildings. It is834
thus a ‘fully discriminative attribute’ (Mangold & Pobel, 1988, p. 182). Mehta et al. (1994)835
call this ‘Schelling salience’, whereas they would describe AS as a measure of ‘primary836
salience’. Schelling salience involves identifying a rule of selection that distinguishes one837
particular strategy (an item or signal) from all others (only banks are buildings, in the838
context of this task).839
In that case, the present study supports the distinction between kinds of salience840
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proposed by Mehta et al. However, they draw the distinction based on whether or not841
participants were told to coordinate, whereas we find that primary salience predicts most842
of the behavior in a non-communicative coordination task, some of the behavior in an843
open-ended communication task or one where the signal space is constrained for the844
signaler, and very little when the meaning space is constrained for the receiver. A potential845
explanation is that Mehta et al. find a role for Schelling salience because their task is much846
more constrained than our Study 2, and in that regard it is more like receiver behavior847
here. For instance, in their verbal coordination task, participants had to name makes of car848
or types of flower. In that case, their results do not represent a general solution to the849
problem of coordination, but rather reflect behavior when the semantic space is narrowly850
constrained, as it is in the present study.851
Because this form of salience involves distinguishing one item from the others, it must852
depend on what the others are. In that case, the identification of a fully discriminative853
attribute could involve some kind of context-sensitive (i.e., flexible) reasoning, whereas854
primary salience simply requires that people respond with whatever occurs to them first,855
without further reflection. Our results are thus compatible with the claim that adult856
humans have two cognitive systems for inferring others’ beliefs: one that is cognitively857
efficient but inflexible, and another that is more flexible, but cognitively demanding858
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). In that case, our results imply that contextual constraint in859
the meaning space is one factor driving differential recruitment of these systems.860
However, just how to characterize the relevant systems is currently an open question.861
For instance, Postema (2008) argues that reasoning about salience is a creative process,862
while Apperly and Butterfill (2009) make no such claim. Similarly, Samson, Apperly,863
Kathirgamanathan, and Humphreys (2005) argue that different cognitive processes are864
involved in inhibiting egocentric perspective and identifying allocentric perspective, and it865
is not clear how this lines up with the distinction in Apperly and Butterfill (2009).866
Note that is not enough to say that Schelling salience explains behavior here, since867
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that does not explain why people made these particular choices and not others. Having a868
door and being a building are both fully discriminative attributes of banks in this context,869
but the latter seems more natural. The idea that ‘naturalness’ has something to do with870
salience is found already in Lewis (1969), but Cubitt and Sugden interpret this to mean a871
‘natural association of ideas’ (2003, 201), which sounds very much like the sort of872
associative relationship captured by AS. Thus, if naturalness plays a role in Schelling873
salience, then the distinction between Schelling salience and primary salience becomes874
blurred. Regardless, while we could confidently predict what responses people would give875
in a task like Study 1 (and could do so, allowing for more error, in a task like Study 2), it is876
far from clear that anyone could do so for the current task in a non-post-hoc way. An877
explanation based on Schelling salience is thus unscientific, as things currently stand.878
Study 5: Replication of main results879
To test the robustness of the main findings in studies 1–4, we conducted a replication880
with a larger sample size. Below, ‘task 1’ refers to the task from Study 1; ‘task 2’ to that881
from Study 2, etc.882
Participants883
Participants were recruited from the same population as studies 1–4 using the same884
inclusion criteria. We recruited 200 signalers, 40 for each task. We recruited 400 receivers885
to guess the most common signals produced in the communicative task. We did not recruit886
receivers for the common-ground version of the constrained-meaning-space task since, as887
discussed above, it is behaviorally dissimilar to the other tasks.888
Materials889
The stimuli were identical to Studies 1–4.890
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Procedure891
The procedure was identical to Studies 1–4, with one exception. Each receiver was892
given 20 signals, and only one signal per item. This change is motivated by a potential893
confound. In Study 2, receivers saw a random sample of 18 signals. This means that some894
receivers may have seen more than one signal for a given item. Even though they were895
unaware of this (since they did not know what the items were, so could not have known896
which item prompted each signal), they may have been motivated not to produce the same897
guess more than once, for different signals5. Here we avoid this potential confound by898
recruiting receivers for the 20 most common signals per item, and by showing each receiver899
only one signal per item.900
Results901
Success. The success scores for each task are displayed in Fig. 11. The pattern of902
results resembles that observed in Fig. 8. Modeling the effect of task on performance with a903
binomial mixed-effects regression (including a maximal random-effects structure), we found904
that performance in a constrained signal space (task 3) was better than in the open-ended905
task 2 (β = 0.41, SE = 0.18, z = 2.32, p = .026). When the random effects structure906
includes only intercepts for item and participant, performance in the non-communicative907
task 1 is significantly better than task 2 (β = 0.38, SE = 0.09, z = 3.94, p < .001).908
However, with the inclusion of a by-task random slope for item, this difference becomes909
non-significant (β = 0.34, SE = 0.3, z = 1.11, p = .27). We thus conclude that the910
previously observed difference between tasks 1 and 2 is not robust, though constraining the911
signal space (task 3) consistently boosts performance. As previously, there is no912
relationship between by-item success in task 1 and task 2 (r = −.08, p = .72). In task 2,913
success is positively predicted by receiver-POV salience (β = 14.95, SE = 0.48, t = 31.01,914
p < .001), and negatively predicted by signaler-POV salience (β = −1.87, SE = 0.45,915
5 We thank Dale Barr for this observation.
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t = −4.15, p < .001). Thus, in this open-ended communicative task, shared knowledge can916




























Figure 11 . Mean values for coordination success (formula 1 for Study 1, formula 2 for others) across
studies. Task 4 represents the no-common-ground task – see discussion above.
Response likelihood. As previously, forward associative strength (AS) was a918
strong predictor of response likelihood in non-communicative task 1 (β = 5.78, SE = 0.29,919
z = 20.8, p < .001). In communicative task 2, we included both forward and backward AS920
as predictors to test whether signalers were able to take perspective. We find a significant921
effect of forward AS (β = 4.57, SE = 0.39, z = 11.55, p < .001) but not backward AS922
(β = 0.36, SE = 0.34, z = 1.06, p = .29), indicating that signalers failed to take923
perspective in this open-ended signaling task.924
These results were robust across different databases of word association norms (see925
supplementary material), except that Small World of Words (SWOW) norms produced a926
significant effect of backward AS (β = 0.86, SE = 0.28, z = 3.09, p = .002), though this927
was smaller than the effect of forward AS with the same norms (β = 5.26, SE = 0.37,928
z = 14.3, p < .001). Thus, there is evidence for a large effect of egocentricity across all929
norms databases, and evidence from one norms database for a small effect of allocentricity.930
We conclude that signaling in the open-ended task is predominantly egocentric.931
The receivers were also egocentric (forward AS: β = 4.4, SE = 0.18, z = 24.03,932
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p < .001; backward AS:β = 0.14, SE = 0.19, z = 0.73, p = 0.47). Unlike Study 2, we found933
no evidence that receivers were more egocentric than signalers, since the interaction934
between communicative role and forward AS is not significant (forward AS β = 4.53,935
SE = 0.17, z = 27.34, p < .001; role β = 0.42, SE = 0.06, z = 7.29, p < .001; role:forward936
AS β = 0.02, SE = 0.17, z = 0.11, p = .91).937
When we constrained the signal space (task 3), we observed a significant effect of938
backward AS (β = 1.77, SE = 0.69, z = 2.57, p = .01) and no effect of forward AS939
(β = −0.76, SE = 0.86, z = −0.88, p = .38). This confirms that constraining the signal940
space produces allocentric behavior. The result is consistent across word-association norms941
databases (see supplementary material).942
In task 4, when common ground was emphasized by informing signalers that receivers943
would be choosing from a short list of targets visible to both receivers and signalers,944
forward AS was a significant predictor of signaling (β = 2.41, SE = 0.35, z = 6.78,945
p < .001) but backward AS was not (β = 0.35, SE = 0.39, z = 0.88, p = .38). However,946
using SWOW norms again showed an effect of backward AS (β = 0.95, SE = 0.19,947
z = 5.05, p < .001) which, though significant, was smaller than the forward AS effect with948
the same norms (β = 3.02, SE = 0.32, z = 9.54, p < .001).949
In the no-common-ground version of task 4, signalers were given a short list of950
possible targets, but were told that receivers would not have access to the list when951
guessing. Here, we found an effect of both forward AS (β = 3.71, SE = 0.41, z = 9.15,952
p < .001) and backward AS (β = 1.22, SE = 0.36, z = 3.41, p < .001).953
In this replication, the instructional manipulation (i.e., telling the signaler whether954
the receiver would see the same list of targets) did not have the same effect as in Study 4.955
In the original study, signalers were more allocentric in the common-ground task, and more956
egocentric in the no-common-ground task. This inconsistency suggests that the957
instructional manipulation is unreliable.958
In order to model the effect of this instructional manipulation explicitly, we combined959
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data for both the common-ground and no-common-ground tasks, and included task version960
as a main effect, along with a pair of two-way interactions, one between task and forward961
AS; the other between task and backward AS. There was a significant main effect of both962
forward AS (β = 3.05, SE = 0.4, z = 7.53, p < .001) and backward AS (β = 0.68,963
SE = 0.32, z = 2.1, p = .035). There were also significant effects for the interaction964
between task and forward AS (β = 1.46, SE = 0.26, z = 5.52, p < .001) and between task965
and backward AS (β = 0.56, SE = 0.26, z = 2.19, p = .029). However, there was no main966
effect of task (β = −0.08, SE = 0.08, z = −1.03, p = .3).967
Thus, when the meaning space was constrained, participants produced both ego- and968
allocentric responses, though the effect of egocentric salience was stronger. This coheres969
with the analysis in Study 4 with the same predictors. The results also show that970
emphasizing common ground causes AS (whether forward or backward) to be a weaker971
predictor of signaling behavior. Thus, the instructional manipulation focusing on common972
ground does not necessarily boost allocentric behavior (as may have been suggested by the973
results from Study 4). Rather, it promotes signaling behavior that is poorly predicted by974
AS, unlike all the other tasks, and unlike the no-common-ground version of this task.975
Fig. 12 compares the regression coefficients presented here with those from studies976
1–4.977
Discussion978
We replicate the findings that (1) salience is a driver of both non-communicative and979
communicative behavior, but success in a non-communicative task does not predict success980
in a communicative task; (2) signalers are egocentric in an open-ended communicative task;981
(3) they are allocentric when the signaling space is constrained; (4) constraining the982
meaning space can also boost allocentricity to a degree, but responses were still more983
egocentric on the whole.984
Task 4 appears to be qualitatively different from all the others, and is in need of985
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Figure 12 . A comparison of the model parameters for forward and backward AS across tasks 1–4 reported
here and those reported in studies 1–4 above. The parameters representing task 4 are those that model
both datasets combined with task version as a fixed effect. Overall, behavior in tasks 1 and 2 was
egocentric, task 3 was allocentric. The responses in task 4 were a mixture of ego- and allocentric, but
predominantly the former.
further study, especially since so many lab-based studies of coordination during986
communication assume a constrained meaning space. The precise contents of the987
constrained meaning space likely play an important role. It is currently unclear whether988
the small effect of backward AS in task 4 means that the meaning space caused a small989
percentage of people to be more allocentric; or that it caused all people to be more990
allocentric to a small degree. We are currently investigating individual differences in991
signaling, which will hopefully address issues such as this.992
Finally, we reiterate that while salience might drive response behavior (since forward993
AS predicts response rates in both tasks 1 and 2), this does not mean that salience predicts994
success across tasks, since success in task 1 was unrelated to success in task 2.995
General discussion996
Our principal aim was to test whether perspective taking and shared world997
knowledge (especially patterns of salience in that knowledge) explain human success at998
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novel signaling tasks. We found that associative strength (AS) predicts behavior and999
success in a non-communicative Schelling task (Study 1), and thus serves as an empirical1000
measure of salience. The same measure shows that people do not take perspective in a1001
communicative task (Study 2). Constraining the signaling space by allowing a choice1002
among just five signals (Study 3) boosted both coordination success and perspective1003
taking. Constraining the meaning space such that the target could only be one of five cues1004
(Study 4) boosted success. It also promoted signaler perspective-taking to a degree.1005
The above findings were replicated in Study 5 with a larger N, except that we found1006
the instructional manipulation in Study 4 to be unreliable. However, the results combining1007
common-ground and no-common-ground versions of task 4 were consistent in the original1008
study and in the replication: constraining the meaning space boosted allocentric behavior,1009
though responses were still egocentric overall.1010
Comparing results across studies, one finding is that salience is a general driver of1011
behavior (though less so when the meaning space is constrained, especially in the1012
common-ground task), but not a general driver of success. People share a great deal of1013
world knowledge – surely everyone knows that money is a salient feature of banks – and1014
this common knowledge drove participants to frequently generate ‘money’ in response to1015
‘bank’ in both communicative and non-communicative tasks. However, by-item success in1016
the non-communicative task does not predict success in the communicative tasks, so the1017
relationship between salience and success is task-dependent. Further, participants1018
generated egocentric responses when signaling open-endedly, but generated allocentric ones1019
when the signal space was constrained. Thus, it is not shared world knowledge that1020
explains perspective taking, but contextual constraint. Successful perspective taking in a1021
novel signaling task represents a special case, rather than a general explanation of human1022
success across tasks.1023
Our results also problematize appeals to ‘mutual salience’. We all share a great deal1024
of world knowledge, and the patterns of salience in that knowledge do not differ wildly, at1025
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least, in the broad strokes relevant here (as mentioned, everyone knows that money is a1026
feature of banks). However, the existence of mutual salience depends on whether people1027
approach a problem from the same or from different directions. In a novel signaling task,1028
signaler and receiver approach the problem from different directions, and this affects1029
performance negatively, unless their attention is focused on a restricted meaning space.1030
Thus, if common ground plays a role in perspective taking in novel signaling tasks, it is in1031
this focal sense, as opposed to the vast, unconstrained body of background knowledge that1032
people typically share.1033
Constraining the meaning space for the receiver boosted success tremendously (Study1034
4), but this caused AS to become a poor predictor of behavior. We discussed one1035
possibility for what else might predict such behavior: Schelling salience, as opposed to1036
primary salience. AS only measures the latter, and we identified some gaps that must be1037
filled before the former can serve as a scientific explanation of behavior.1038
A common theme in the literature on perspective taking is the time-course for when1039
(if at all) allocentric information becomes available or is integrated into utterance design1040
(Barr, 2008; Hanna et al., 2003; Keysar et al., 2000). However, rather than focusing on this1041
time-course, we have focused on contextual effects. Details about the time-course of ego- or1042
allocentric information probably vary between our different tasks (perhaps signalers in1043
study 3 fixate on ‘money’ before selecting ‘teller’), but this matter must be left for future1044
research. The main motivating factor for our focus on contextual factors is that human1045
performance at novel signaling tasks is relatively unconstrained (e.g., in Pictionary, where1046
the target meaning could be one of thousands of possibilities), so if we explored only1047
constrained contexts, we would not be able to draw conclusions about open-ended novel1048
signaling tasks.1049
Overall, the results suggest that a signaling system based on salience is unlikely to1050
afford perspective taking in the absence of a highly constraining context. A similar point1051
could be made about any account where accessibility is foundational, such as Sperber and1052
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Wilson (1995). While an ideal, rational agent (the sort described in game-theoretic1053
accounts such as Lewis, 1969) might be able to use its world knowledge to make a choice1054
that is both salient and allocentric, the evidence here shows that humans, though capable1055
of evaluating the relevant world knowledge appropriately, are not always able to bring that1056
relevant knowledge to bear on a particular problem. In the open-ended case, they are1057
trapped by the salience of whatever is most likely to occur to them first, and do not1058
spontaneously escape this egocentric bias.1059
These results paint a pessimistic view of perspective taking, raising the question of1060
how our ancestors could ever evolve signaling conventions. One potential solution to this1061
question is interaction. Apart from the signal itself, our participants did not interact, so we1062
are currently exploring the effect of feedback and practice in follow-up studies. Garrod and1063
Pickering (2004) argue that interaction boosts alignment, which may diminish the need to1064
explicitly represent how one’s interlocutor’s representations differ from one’s own,1065
potentially reducing the explanatory burden placed on perspective taking. Indeed, Garrod1066
et al. (2007) show that interaction ultimately leads to conventionalization in a graphical1067
novel signaling task. Even though we think interaction would ultimately shoulder much of1068
the explanatory burden, our aim was to evaluate the common claim that salience and1069
perspective taking are key drivers of success. To evaluate the ego- or allocentricity of1070
people’s responses based on world knowledge, it was necessary to exclude any potential1071
effect of communicative interaction, hence the use here of a one-shot task.1072
Since cognitive opacity was one of the issues identified above, a second solution would1073
be to shift some of the inferential burden from cognitively opaque information (such as a1074
novel signal) to cognitively transparent information, such as inferring someone’s goals1075
based on non-communicative behavior (cf. Tomasello, 1999). For instance, if one person1076
observes another picking up their spear, they might infer that they are going hunting. This1077
would constrain the context prior to a novel signaling interaction, and we have shown that1078
a constrained context boosts success and (depending on the task) perspective taking.1079
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Our results also suggest that producing a signal is cognitively different from producing1080
an interpretation. Although some contexts promoted perspective taking in signalers, none1081
did so for receivers. Constraining the receiver’s choices (Study 4) had a markedly different1082
effect from constraining the signaler’s choices (Study 3), not only in terms of promoting1083
success, but also in terms of the extent to which primary salience explains behavior.1084
We do not wish to claim that people cannot take the perspective of others in a broad1085
sense. It is possible to put yourself in the emotional shoes of another person, or to work1086
out that someone else can see something you can’t, but neither of these involve overriding1087
egocentric salience in world knowledge to find something allocentrically salient. Nor are we1088
claiming that no one behaves allocentrically. One of our participants had a knack for doing1089
this (see supplementary material), but a failure of perspective taking represents the more1090
general case. We are currently undertaking an individual-differences study to identify why1091
some people are better at this task than others. Nor do our results speak to a theory of1092
mind. Person A might know that Person B knows that A knows that banks have tellers,1093
but the results show that this needn’t imply success at a novel signaling task about banks.1094
In any case, A knowing that B knows that A knows that banks have tellers does not suffer1095
from the asymmetries identified above.1096
Conclusions1097
We have shown that patterns of salience in world knowledge and perspective taking1098
are not general drivers of success in a novel signaling task. Success in a non-communicative1099
task did not generalize to an otherwise-similar communicative task. The same patterns of1100
salience drive responses in both cases. However, the asymmetries inherent in1101
communication mean that the same responses can be successful in one task type and not in1102
the other. Though signalers and receivers share a great deal of world knowledge, signalers1103
were typically unable to leverage this knowledge to override whatever was egocentrically1104
salient and find something allocentrically salient.1105
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It was contextual constraint rather than mutual salience that helped signalers behave1106
allocentrically in certain specific situations. Receivers, on the the other hand, were always1107
egocentric, perhaps because they were biased to assume informative signalers, or perhaps1108
because interpreting a signal involved more uncertainty than generating a signal. We leave1109
open the possibility that interaction is a major driver of human success in novel signaling1110
tasks, since our aim here was to test particular claims about shared world knowledge and1111
perspective taking.1112
Supplementary Information1113
All data (as well as the R scripts for statistical analyses) are available at1114
https://osf.io/frkeb/.1115
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